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Abstract 
The purpose of this theory developing study is to develop Paul Collier’s (2007) 
theory of development traps by considering the possibility of adding a fifth trap, 
the aid trap. This will be conducted through in depth analyses of the impact of 
foreign aid in post-conflictual Cambodia. The results aim to be relevant on a 
boarder context in the hope to contribute to the research of other aid dependent, 
post-conflictual, countries. The focus of the study is to examine what impact 
foreign aid has had on the development of Cambodia, with a focus on grass-root 
level livelihood and human rights. Previous research has shown that foreign aid in 
developing states with weak governance often has a negative impact on the 
recipient country’s development. Aid in modern times is often aimed at boosting 
economic growth and welfare which has had a tendency to stabilise incumbent 
regimes, allowing them to hold on to power while ignoring the needs of the 
people within the state. 
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1 Introduction 
After the initial United Nations’ (UN) administrated 1993 election in Cambodia, 
the country experienced a staggering economic growth and development of 
infrastructure.. The involvement of foreign actors during this period has been very 
high and the aid donated to the country has been heavily focused on economic 
growth and development of infrastructure. During the years from 2002 to 2010 the 
Cambodian government received net aid of 94.3 percent of the nations budget. 
The domestic revenues during this period had no chance in keeping up with the 
nation’s expenditures, which made Cambodia extremely dependent on aid (Ear, 
2013: 28). Today Cambodia is one of the worlds most corrupt countries ranking 
160/177 on Transparency International’s 2013 index of perceived corruption 
(Transparency.org, 2014). A big portion of the population lives in poverty in rural 
areas, where neither the economic growth nor the foreign aid seems to reach them. 
Lately, acute human rights violations in Cambodia consisting of land grabbing 
and forced evictions have come to the world’s attention. In the following study the 
foreign aid to Cambodia will be analysed to estimate the threat foreign aid 
possibly poses on the development of Cambodia. 
1.1 Framing of problem & main research question  
This study aims to develop Paul Collier’s (2007) theory of development traps by 
examining the possibility of adding a fifth trap to his list, the aid trap. Collier’s 
current traps are all defined by factors that keep the world’s least developed 
countries from developing, factors that imprison them in what Collier refers to as 
the “bottom billion”, the poorest of the world. What may be lacking from 
Collier’s theoretical framework is to regard foreign aid as a possible trap. 
Therefore, in this study I intend to explore the possibility of foreign aid to be 
viewed as a trap that harms the development of the post-conflictual Cambodia, 
with a focus on grass-root livelihood and human rights.  
 
The main research questions of the study are the following: 
- In what way can foreign aid be considered to harm the post-conflictual 
development of Cambodia with a focus on grass-root level and human rights? 
 
-  To what extent is foreign aid to be considered as a threat to post- conflictual 
development and therefore to be considered as a trap for development? 
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1.2 Definitions  
Bottom billion is a term Collier (2007: 3, 7) uses to describe the least-developed 
countries where the per capita income is very low. These countries are 
geographically labelled as Africa +, where the plus represents countries such as 
North Korea, Haiti, Bolivia and Cambodia. Together all these countries hold 
approximately a billion people living under the poverty line.  
    Foreign aid has been defined by Ear (2013, 10) as “a voluntary transfer of 
resources from one country to another, given at least partly with the objective of 
benefiting the recipient country”. In this thesis foreign aid may also refer to 
investments of forging actors to improve development in bottom billion countries. 
    Aid dependence has over the years been defined in various ways by scholars 
and theorists. In the 1970s neoliberal economists defined it as “a condition in 
which overreliance on aid produces economic distortions that affect local 
decision-making and reduces efficiency.” (Hughes, 2009: 7). This is the definition 
that will be used in this thesis. 
1.3 Generalizability and relevance  
The common way to reach generalizability in theory developing case study is 
theoretical sampling. Due to primarily temporal limitations of this thesis the 
theoretical sampling is left out to leave room for more in-depth research of the 
single case. However, through a certain analytical approach, generalizability is 
possible through single case studies. This approach suggests that generalizability 
is present in any case since the basic social construction is the same in all cases 
(Teorell – Svensson, 2007: 147). Peräkylä (2004: 297), whom is a proponent of 
this approach, argues for the generalizability in his single case study by showing 
that the results are generalizable in the manner that they show what could be done 
in other cases, instead of showing what is done in other cases. For this theory, 
developing study generalizability is attempted by showing that if this case proves 
the necessity of the aid trap, then this necessity could be proven in other similar 
cases. 
 
Furthermore, the relevance of this study is to be considered rather high. According 
to Teorell and Svensson (2007: 18) studies that are considered relevant due to 
their contribution to previous research within the field are referred to as 
cumulative. This indicates that the study both builds on and contributes to relevant 
research. There is a high level of relevance to be found in the research of foreign 
aid’s effect on post-conflictual Cambodia and the development and necessity for 
the aid trap. The study both builds on previous research while also aiming to make 
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a contribution to the field of peace and conflict studies by developing Collier’s 
theory of development traps. 
 
The case of Cambodia is found relevant for this study due to the subject at hand 
being highly observable in the case. Post-conflictual Cambodia is today a state 
with economic growth, growing infrastructure and a relatively stable government, 
although its legitimacy may be questioned. However, despite enormous amounts 
of foreign aid Cambodia is still a very poor country where human rights are being 
violated on a regular basis (Ear, 2013: 116-19, We Will Not Be Moved, 2013). This 
makes Cambodia an interesting case to study and promising for findings 
supporting the theory development. 
1.4 Scope and limitations 
A qualitative case study per se narrows the scope of the study. It is temporarily 
restricted to the post-conflictual era of Cambodia and thus spans the period of 
1993 - when the United Nation temporarily seized control of the state – until 
2014, with a main focus on the 2010s. This time span is not only chosen in 
accordance to the temporal limitations to the thesis but also obtains a high level of 
relevance for the results of the study. The nature of the post-conflictual state puts 
forward a rather extreme case of a developing country. A single case study 
benefits from using an extreme case in order to produce more confident results.  
1.5 Previous research and related work 
The theoretical point of departure of this thesis builds upon previous findings 
concluding that aid can have a hampering affect on governance and development 
in poor countries. These finding will function as theoretical point of departure, 
which will be further presented in the following section. However, this theory is 
already well established and will therefore not be thoroughly analysed in this 
thesis. Other case studies analysing the relation between governance and foreign 
aid have already given the theory increased empirical support.. These case studies 
have been conducted on countries such as Tanzania (Falck: 1997), Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Abuzeid, 2009), Mozambique (Appolinario, 2010), and most recent on 
Cambodia (Ear, 2013). Sophal Ear’s book Aid dependence in Cambodia published 
2013 has proven to be of great assistance in the development of the aid trap and 
will therefore be thoroughly analysed thus I believe that will help generate more 
confident results.  
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2 Theory 
2.1 Theoretical points of departure  
The study draws upon previous research of foreign aid initially conducted by 
Peter Boone (1995). Boone concludes in his research that foreign aid does not 
necessarily increase economic growth in the recipient country, but it does increase 
the size of the government. In countries with a already stable government and a 
good policy environment, aid has a tendency to significantly increase economic 
growth. However, aid directed at countries with weak and/or corrupt governments 
with near to non-existent transparency in economic management, aid does not 
have any significant positive effect on the country nor does it spur economic 
growth (Ear, 2013: 16-17, Boone, 1995: 2 - 5). Furthermore, Deborah Bräutigam 
(2000: 6, 62) supports Boone’s findings in her research arguing that foreign aid 
can be part of the actual problem in developing countries, hampering governance 
reforms and allowing incumbent regimes to hold on to power without contributing 
to development. Stephan Knack (2001: 310-12) builds upon Boone’s and 
Bräutigam’s research when he analyses aid’s impact on governance through 
collection of cross-country data. He concludes that higher level of aid decreases 
governance capacity by weakening political accountability.  
2.2 Collier’s traps   
With the previous research on foreign aid as a point of departure, the study will 
aim to develop Collier’s (2007) theory of development traps by exploring the 
possibility of adding the aid trap. In his research Collier concludes that within 
developing countries there are certain problematic issues that can trap them in 
poverty, keeping them from developing. When examining the necessity and 
relevance of the aid trap, Collier’s traps will be used as a foundation for the 
formation of it. More detailed and lengthy examinations of his traps will be 
conducted in section 4. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Qualitative case study  
An intensive qualitative case study makes it possible to conduct a more in-depth 
study aiming to analyse different nuances of the case and thus obtain a more 
complete view of the study. Theory development requires in-depth description and 
analysis of the case, which is provided in qualitative case study research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 538). The study is conducted in a qualitative manner due to the 
fact that the subject at hand is more successfully studied with a qualitative 
method. That is, from the use of in-depth data covering different aspects and 
nuances of the case (Glaser – Strauss, 1967: 18). The nuances refer to the different 
variables that will be studied within the case, such as human rights, economic 
growth, poverty, aid flows, governance capacity, corruption etc. (Jacobsen, 2002: 
94, 95, 106, 116, Yin, 2007: 31).  
 
Important for successful theory development is the identification of a case that 
will prove most relevant and effective for the purpose (George – Bennett, 2005: 
111). When developing a theory grounded in a single case, due to the very limited 
number of cases, it is preferable to choose an extreme case in which the 
phenomenon of interest is observable (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537). The case of post-
conflictual Cambodia has been chosen based on these premises and is found 
particularly relevant for both successful execution of the research and for 
confident findings. 
 
The intensive approach somewhat go hand in hand with the single case study. Due 
to its in-depth, intensive nature a single case study is most useful in answering 
research questions posing a how or why question (Yin, 2007: 23). In this theory 
developing study these questions will lead the study forward. The analysis focuses 
on how the aid trap will be constructed while also placing emphasis on why a fifth 
trap would be necessary. 
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3.2 Theory development 
Traditionally methodology in qualitative research has been focused on verification 
and testing of already existing theories. Very little attention has been given to the 
generation and development of these theories (Hartman, 2001: 9). According to 
Merriam (1994: 152-53), the key to a theory developing qualitative study is 
speculations. This indicates that the researcher plays with, and speculates about, 
ideas concerning the data on a more abstract level throughout the research. This 
differs from descriptive qualitative case study where the researcher primarily 
observes the data and describes the phenomenon within the case. In theory 
development the research questions formatted at the early stage of the study are 
always tentative (Eisenhardt, 1989: 536). According to Eisenhardt one of the more 
important aspects of theory development is the simultaneous process of data 
collection and data analysis (ibid: 538).  
 
One of the main methods of developing a theory from empirical data is called 
grounded theory methodology (Merriam, 1994: 153). This type of methodology is 
suitable for research that aims to generate or develop a theory that is directly 
derived from empirical data (Hartman, 2001: 9, Glaser, 1998: 3). The grounded 
theory methodology was originally developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and 
introduced in their book Discovering Grounded Theory first published in 1967. In 
grounded theory research, the framing of problem and research questions emerges 
from the collection and/or analysis of the data, in contrast to other research 
methods where the data emerges from the research question (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
536). As the data collection began for this study, the current research questions 
were not formed. The data collection simply relied on my interests of the 
implications of foreign aid in post-conflictual countries. As the study proceeded 
and more data was collected, the idea of aid as a trap emerged and so did the 
research problem and questions.  
 
This study is inspired by grounded theory methodology and is in many aspects 
conducted according to it. However, since this study draws upon previous 
research and aims to develop Collier’s trap theory, its methodological starting 
point differs from the one of grounded theory (Alvesson - Kärreman, 2011: 23).  
3.3 Theoretical sensitivity  
Theoretical sensitivity is an important part of theory development, especially in 
grounded theory methodology (Strauss – Corbin, 1990: 41). It is generated by the 
researcher throughout the research process and concerns the researcher’s 
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awareness of the collected data and ability to understand and give meaning to it. 
Through obtaining theoretical sensitivity the researcher can focus on the important 
part of the data that supports the generation of theory. It is the theoretical 
sensitivity that allows the researcher to controls the data collection to make sure it 
stays relevant to the development of theory (Hartman, 2001: 97-98). Theoretical 
sensitivity can come from different types of sources such as literature, personal 
observation, interviews etc. This study is primarily based on literary sources and 
will therefore focus on solely that. Strauss and Corbin (1990: 42) argues that 
becoming familiar with the literature, both concerning theory and the empirical 
data, will sensitize the research to the case being studied.  
 
The theoretical sensitivity somewhat represents the creative aspect of grounded 
theory and theory development (Strauss – Corbin, 1990, 44). Theory development 
is in itself partly a creative process since the researcher has to go further than 
simply observing a phenomenon or testing an exiting theory. However, by active 
awareness of the data collection and striving towards theoretical sensitivity, the 
researcher can obtain a balance between the creative aspect and scientific aspect 
of the study, not letting either one dominate the research.  
3.4 Data collection 
Most case studies are characterised by an enormous amount of detailed data. This 
might be somewhat overwhelming but the purpose is to gain as much relevant 
information about the case as possible. This way one becomes more familiar and 
comfortable with the case, which will generate more confident findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). According to Alvesson and Kärreman (2013: 23-24) the 
collecting of data in grounded theory methodology should initially be guided by 
the interests of the researcher. Thereafter the research questions are developed 
from the researchers’ interpretation of the data. In this study a significant part of 
the material has been collected through online searches primarily within search 
engines such as Google and LUBsearch. By using key words such as Cambodia, 
foreign aid and human rights it has been possible to gather material consisting of 
both relevant websites, online news articles and academic online articles. The 
online searches have exclusively been based on personal interest and curiosity, 
which has led to the formation of the research questions.  
 
The empirical data has been limited to analyses written in English and Swedish. 
Analysis of this type of data is commonly referred to as secondary analysis 
(Corbin – Strauss, 2008: 156). The secondary sources cover a wide span of the 
case and have been compared to each other. This is to make sure that the 
secondary analysis will be as close to the reality as possible. According to 
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Merriam (1994: 24) the single case study, in contrast to other types of studies, is 
not limited to a specific manner of collecting data. Therefore, the collected 
material is only limited to temporal and spatial limitations. Since this study draws 
upon previous research and aims to develop a theory, a significant part of the 
material consists of literature relevant to these theories. Colliers book The Bottom 
Billion (2007) is of great importance to the study and is therefore a centrepiece of 
the analysis. Furthermore, literature relevant to research of foreign aid’s effect on 
good governance works as a foundation to the analysis..  
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4 The traps 
In the following section two of Collier’s four traps will be examined, the natural 
resource trap and the bad governance in small country trap. The latter will be 
referred to as the bad governance trap. The examination of the construction and 
conditions of these two traps will be most fruitful for the purpose of the study. 
The remaining two traps, the conflict trap and landlocked with bad neighbours 
trap will not be analysed, this is because these two traps does not prove very 
relevant nor fruitful to this study. A brief explanation to why this is will be 
presented below.  
 
In Collier’s (2007: 17-37) chapter about the conflict trap he shows how conflicts 
such as civil wars and coup d’états can trap a low-income country in poverty, and 
how the chances of this are much greater in a bottom billion country than in a 
high-income country. What makes the conflict trap inapt for this study is the fact 
that in the conflict trap, the source of the problem that hampers growth and 
development comes from within the state, from civil wars or coup d’états. This 
study examines instead how an outside factor, such as aid, may hamper economic 
growth. This makes the aid trap and conflict trap fundamentally very different 
which is why the conflict trap will be left out of the analysis. The landlocked with 
bad neighbours trap is inappropriate for this study for rather different reasons to 
the conflict trap. The bad neighbours trap concerns geography as the hampering 
factor on development of bottom billion countries. Collier (2007: 54-58) argues 
that a resource-scarce country that is surrounded by bad neighbours can have a 
very hard time developing and growing. When examining foreign aid as a possible 
trap, the geographical aspect is rather irrelevant. Surely, the natural resources of 
the recipient state are determined by its locations, which may affect the interests 
and motivation by the donator. However, the directly neighbouring countries do 
not to any larger scale affect the aid donated.  
 
In a study with a larger scope, I am sure that the conflict trap and the bad 
neighbours trap could have contributed to the development of the aid trap, and 
maybe in future research this can be shown. However, in this study I put greater 
value in examining the most relevant and useful traps thoroughly, which I believe 
will generate more confident results. 
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4.1 The natural resource trap   
According to Collier (2007: 44-46), in certain political environments, natural 
resource richness can harm democracy and governance capacity. In a healthy 
democratic governance environment, political parties will attract voters by trying 
to provide good public services and other public goods. However, natural resource 
revenues can provide the government with a large budget from which it can 
embezzle money to buy votes by providing individual and specific benefits to 
voters instead of public goods. It is primarily in fragile states, with a culture of 
corruption, wherein this will occur. State such as bottom billion countries and 
developing states are especially at risk.  
 
The reason why large natural resource revenues weaken governance capacity is 
fairly simple, it drastically reduces the need for the state to tax, which reduces its 
need for accountability (Collier, 2007: 46). The lost need for accountability in 
resource rich states has been used as an explanation to why these states become 
autocracies. However, Collier (2007: 46) argues that these states can still remain 
democratic on the surface by maintaining the electoral process. Thereby it is not 
the manner of achieving power that is undermined by the loss of accountability, 
but instead it is the manner of using power, the political restraints, that gets 
undermined. To measure political restraints on power, political scientists have 
developed a system built upon counting how many, out of a maximum of 17, 
checks-and-balances can be found within the political environment. Checks-and-
balances is a system wherein different parts within a government have the power 
to control, affect and prevent actions by other parts so that the latter can’t become 
too powerful (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). In this system the different checks-
and-balances are e.g. free and independent media and an independent judiciary 
(Collier, 2007: 47). Collier (2007: 43,47) found that when it comes to large 
natural resource revenues, autocracies perform better than democracies. However, 
according to the measuring system mentioned earlier, the democratic state would 
only have to have four checks-and-balances out of the 17 in order to perform just 
as well as an autocracy. It may not sound like a lot, but most resource rich states 
have approximately two out of all the 17 checks-and-balances. What is important 
to acknowledge is that a resource rich state with low political restraints is not 
likely to just add four checks-and-balances to resolve its issues (ibid: 47). 
However, the more checks-and-balances these countries have, i.e., the more 
control from different and independent branches, the less likely is the possibility 
for patronage and corruption.  
 
Natural resource richness isn’t bad per say. The problem with natural resource 
richness in the bottom billion countries is that these states are developing and 
therefore doesn’t have the political restraint and good, stabile governance to start 
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of the economic growth with. Collier (2007: 51) argues that natural resources in 
bottom billion countries contributes to a development trap because these 
countries, with very limited checks-and-balances, are more prone to misuse the 
resources in such a manner that it harms the growth. In turn, this harms the 
democratisation process. 
4.2 The bad governance trap   
In bottom billion countries one reason for bad governance is the political leaders 
lack of motivation to reform. Even though these countries are very poor, the 
political elites in them are often among the richest people in the world, something 
they generally don’t want to change (Collier, 2007: 66). Another reason for the 
bad governance in the bottom billion is the lack of educated people within these 
countries. A political reform requires not only political will but also the necessary 
knowledge and training in order to manage the technicalities of a reform. In many 
bottom billion countries, the few that have this necessary education will often 
leave the country for a better job offer somewhere else (ibid: 67).  
 
A way to prompt a political reform and improve governance has been argued to be 
foreign aid donated with conditions of reform. However, governments in 
developing countries have discovered that they only have to promise to reform in 
order to get the aid, they don’t actually have to do it (ibid: 67). This is further 
emphasised by Knack (2001: 311) who argues that conditional aid to prompt 
political reform is generally rather ineffective. What Collier (2007: 71) concludes 
from his research about the bad governance trap is that in order for a bottom 
billion to shift over to a functioning democracy, the initiative to change has to 
come from within the state.  
4.3 What makes a trap? 
Collier (2007) has developed his traps by analysing cases and empirical data from 
different countries of the bottom billion. When reviewing his research it become 
apparent that there is no general structure or conditions that make a certain issue a 
trap. However, what is evident is that Collier’s traps are exactly what they are 
made out to be; traps. That is, something that a developing country easily can 
“walk” into, and which will lock them into a dysfunctional system thereby 
preventing the country from developing. The problems within Colliers traps are 
very different from each other, what they do have in common is their hampering, 
or trapping, effect on economic growth and development. Collier (2007: 6, 79) 
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explains that there are no clear lines between the traps, which means that they can 
easily overlap each other. Any of the bottom billion countries can be in different 
traps simultaneously, or sequentially. Hughes and Un (2011: 4) argue that the 
post-conflict era in Cambodia is actually the countries route out of the conflict 
trap and into an ear of economic growth. However, in the following section I will 
present the possibility that Cambodia has actually moved into an aid trap.  
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5 Post-conflict development in 
Cambodia 
In October 1991 the four Cambodian fractions, the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea (later renamed Cambodians Peoples Party (CPP)), who were the 
ruling party, the Funcinpec, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front 
(KNPLF) and the Khmer Rouge met with representatives from 19 different 
countries to sign the Paris Peace Accords (Brinkley, 2011: 67). The agreement 
resulted in the first post Cold War UN peacekeeping and state building mission; 
the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the first 
UN administrated election held two years later in 1993 (Hughes – Un, 2011: 4, 
Ear, 2013: 2). When the UN arrived in Cambodia in May 1992 the expectations 
were extremely high as this mission was far more ambitious and expensive than 
anything the UN had undertaken before (Brinkley, 2011: 70). 
 
UNTAC’s mandate was very broad and covered everything from the military and 
governmental administrations to human rights. Its aim was to introduce a multi-
party democracy in Cambodia alongside efforts of state building (Hughes – Un, 
2011: 2). The 1993 election, monitored and administrated by UNTAC, resulted in 
victory for the opposing royalist Funcinpec party, who won 58 seats in the 
parliament whilst CPP came in second with 51 seats (Brinkley, 2011: 80, Hughes 
– Un, 2011: 3, Ear, 2013: 2). However, the CPP leader Hun Sen refused to admit 
his defeat and step down from power. Norodom Sihanouk was the previous king 
of Cambodia and had, during the Paris Peace Accords, been assigned ceremonial 
head of state during the time UNTAC was operating in the country (Brinkley, 
2011: 78). When Hun Sen began threating the Funcinpec party leader Prince 
Norodom Ranariddh with violence, Sihanouk stepped in and decided that he 
himself would serve as king, however with less power than before. Ranariddh and 
Hun Sen would share the power, Ranariddh as first prime minister and Hun Sen as 
second prime minister. They both agreed to this and Hun Sen was pleased, 
knowing that his second prime minister post was manly symbolic and that he 
himself would be in charge (Brinkley, 2011: 85).  
 
In September 1993 UNTAC left Cambodia. Despite the unexpected outcome of 
the election, with Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh as co-ministers in a coalition 
government, the UN referred to UNTAC’s mission in Cambodia as a success 
story (Brinkley, 2011: 81, Ear, 2013: 4).  Since 1993, elections have been held 
every fifth year, in 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013, which have all been won by the 
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CPP.  Hun Sen’s electoral success has been, according to Sullivan (2011: 57), the 
result of vote buying, intimidation, and violence. During these post-conflictual 
years, inequality rose in a manner that had the rest of the world concerned. 
However, during the same years, the national economy has had almost double-
digit growth every year making the Cambodian economy one of the fastest 
growing in the world  (Hughes – Un, 2011: 2, Ear, 2013: 8-9). 
 
Any post-conflictual state is bound to have some sort of positive development 
because the step from war to peace is in itself a step in the right direction. In that 
aspect, the post-conflictual development of Cambodia has been positive. A 
pluralistic political system with parliamentary elections has been established and 
both free media and NGOs are present and working in the country (Sjöberg – 
Sjöholm, 2005: 7). However, Sjöberg and Sjöholm (2005: 5) conclude in their 
report for Sida that the post-conflictual development of Cambodia has been 
disappointing. On the same note, Ear (2013: 9) argues that the so-called positive 
development in Cambodia is only positive on the surface, covering up acute 
problems such as human rights violations and corruption.  
 
UNTAC facilitated the introduction of Western donors to Cambodia and since the 
UN sponsored election in 1993, Cambodia has been heavily dependent on foreign 
donors (Hughes – Un, 2011: 2, Ear, 2013: 8). During the post-conflictual period, 
both foreign donors and the Cambodian government has heavily focused on, and 
invested in, infrastructure. This has enabled the private sector in Cambodia to 
flourish the last decade with increased investments and a steady growth. However, 
the development of the Cambodian state remains rather stagnant and it is still 
considered to be “fragile”. This is mainly due to the widespread corruption and 
authoritarianism within the government, which allows the state to not prioritise 
basic public services (Hughes – Un, 2011: 8-10).  
5.1 Strong government – low quality  
Peter Boone (1995) was the first to examine the relationship between foreign aid 
and governance capacity. In his study he found that aid doesn’t necessarily have 
any positive impact on poverty or governance. However he also found that aid 
increases the size of government. In 1997 Boone’s study motivated the World 
Bank economists Burnside and Dollar to conduct a study examining relationship 
between aid, policies and growth in 56 different countries. They found that aid 
may have a positive impact on growth but mainly in countries that already have a 
good governance. Aid directed at countries with low quality governance does not 
spur economic growth but simply increases the scope, or the size, of the 
government, not the quality of it (Ear, 2013: 16)  
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The post-conflictual democratisation in Cambodia is often portrayed as 
successful. However, what seems to make out successful democratisation is 
simply the presence of elections. It is easy to not set very high standards for post-
conflictual countries, since any democracy is better than none, or because bad and 
unjust government is at least less evil than genocide and dictatorship. Ear (2013: 
41) believes that since the international community did very little to nothing 
during the Khmer Rouge genocide, the developed world now stands embarrassed, 
unwilling to ask to much of Cambodia and allowing the government to “get 
away” with otherwise unacceptable behaviour, blaming it on the country’s terrible 
history. However, simply the presence of elections isn’t enough to make out a 
good and functioning democracy. McCargo (2005: 99-100, 107) argues that after 
the election in 1993, Hun Sen learned how to use the elections to legitimize his 
role as a leader. The elections became more a political theatre to please the 
observing world, rather then a tool of democracy. Cambodia is increasingly 
transitioning from a multi-party state to a one party state wherein Hun Sen holds a 
steady grip on the power (Cock, 2011: 28). Ear (2013: 85) argues that the fact that 
Cambodia is becoming a one party state, despite the international community’s 
presence and the foreign aid, proves that neither foreign aid nor elections can 
make a democracy. In todays Cambodia, corruption is a normalised part of the 
political system and is recognised as standard procedure (Sullivan, 2011: 57-58, 
Ear, 2013: 11). The corruption in Cambodia costs the country approximately 
US$300 to US$500 million every year. The ones who have to pay the highest 
price for this are the poor, which widens the inequality gap further every year 
(Ear, 2013: 143-44).  
 
In 2004 the World Food Program (WFP) reported that US$2 million worth of rice 
had been diverted. The WFP representative blamed the Cambodian government 
and expressed that the government had to take responsibility if WFP where going 
to be able to continue with their work in Cambodia. After further discussions the 
Cambodian government finally took some responsibility, paying back 
US$900’000, but without putting any government officials on trial (Brinkley, 
2011: 185, Ear, 2013: 45-46, 47-48). Since no one was ever convicted for the 
corrupt act, it was not a prosecuted individual that had to reimburse their gains, 
but instead the government who did, using money from a budget largely 
consisting of donated aid. 
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6 Foreign aid to Cambodia 
Today policy makers and researchers make a difference between traditional and 
non-traditional aid donors, the latter also referred to as new or emerging donors. 
Traditional aid donors mainly refer to the member nations of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), originally consisting of 18 
European nations, the USA and Canada but today consists of 34 nations 
worldwide. When generally speaking about donors, it usually refers to these 
OECD nations (Hagedoorn – Beets, 2011: 2, Oecd.org, 2014). These countries 
continuously donate Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing 
states, which is donated according to certain criteria, for example the aid’s main 
objective must be to promote economic growth and welfare (Hagedoorn – Beets, 
2011: 1).  
 
The non-traditional donors can look very different and their type of aid can also 
vary, not necessary consisting of financial means but also goods, technical 
support, medical training or development of infrastructure (ibid: 3). Non-
traditional donors differ from traditional donors in many ways. They are less 
prone to have conditions of political reform or improvement of governance tied to 
the aid. Instead the aid is often tied services from their own country and the focus 
of the aid is to benefit both the donating and the recipient country. The OECD has 
identified different types of non-traditional donors. One of these is the Providers 
to South-South Cooperation (SSC) whom are states that are emerging economies 
and are known for focusing their aid on development of infrastructure and natural 
resources in the recipient state. China is a non-traditional donor and is considered 
to be one of the main countries in the SSC category (ibid: 3-4).  
 
In the following sections I will analyse the traditional aid and the Chinese aid to 
Cambodia. I chose to analyse the traditional aid as a group instead of singling out 
a specific traditional donor country. This is because the outlines of the traditional 
donors are very similar due to the restrictions set by the OECD. However, the 
non-traditional donors can vary a lot, making it harder to analyse them as a group. 
This has also been pointed out by Hagedoorn and Beets (2011: 3) who argue that 
the non-traditional donors have been very hard to classify due the their diversity. 
Therefore, I have chosen to single out China, not only because it is one of the 
biggest non-traditional donors (Ear, 2013: 28), but also because China has played 
an important part in the post-conflictual development of Cambodia. 
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6.1 Traditional aid  
Since the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, the traditional donors have stated 
numerous project, committees and forums in Cambodia. All of which have 
developed project and strategies, funded by foreign aid, to reduce corruption and 
poverty and improve health, equality and governance quality. Since the initial 
involvement of traditional donors, the Cambodian government has successfully 
managed to more or less ignore, or at least fail, their commitments to these 
projects. However, this has not hindered traditional donors from donating more 
aid to the country (Sullivan, 2011: 53).   
 
The traditional aid is characterised by the conditions attached to it. Initially, the 
traditional aid tied to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords was conditioned upon 
the promise of a democratic, multi-party election (ibid). It is further focused on 
the improvement of human rights in Cambodia (Ear, 2013: 109). Ear (2013, 10) 
argues that the aid experiment of Cambodia has proven that, within post-
conflictual settings, foreign aid has a tendency to be contra productive, worsening 
governance and thereby hampering development instead of encouraging it. This is 
because aid changes the dynamics between good and bad governance, making the 
latter more appealing, easier and cheaper.  
 
As the presence of non-traditional donors has increased, the traditional donors 
influence and power they exert on the aid has declined (Ear, 2013: 123-24). 
Sullivan (2011: 54) argues that one possible reason for the increase of conditional 
aid from traditional donors is the fear that too much pressure on the Cambodian 
government will push it closer to non-traditional donors such as China. However, 
the traditional aid has kept flowing into Cambodia, but it appears to avoid issues 
about human rights condition and instead focuses on improvement of 
infrastructure (Cock, 2011: 40-41). In most developing countries rarely more than 
20 percent of aid goes to technical cooperation. However, in Cambodia 50 percent 
of all aid is taken up by technical cooperation (Ear, 2013: 30). What is 
problematic with this is that where the aid is needed the most, e.g. in improving 
human right conditions and poverty, is not where it’s being directed. The 
traditional aid to developing countries, particularly in the southern Asian region, 
has been viewed as a promotion of Western values and norms and conditioned 
upon increased neoliberalism governance. This has been considered as imposing 
upon their culture and society (Hughes, 2009: 162, Sullivan, 2011: 55). This may 
be another reason why the traditional aid has backed down on the conditions of 
political reform and human rights.  
 
From 1992 through 2010 Cambodia received more than US$9 billion in ODA, 
outweighing the income from tax revenues (Sothirak: 2012: 339). This has kept 
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the Cambodian government from having to relay on taxation to found expenses, 
which results in governance accountability becoming both unappealing and 
unnecessary (Hughes, 2009: 156, Ear, 2013: 17). This has resulted in the 
government not having to rely on its people, the voters, which has greatly harmed 
the governance accountability (Ear, 2013: 12). One may think that a resolution to 
this problem is that traditional donors direct their aid to local NGO instead of the 
government. This can occurs when the donating government doesn’t feel able to 
trust the recipient government e.g. due to corruption. A NGO can then function as 
a third party that manages the money. However, the recipient government has to 
give their consent, which is why this doesn’t usually happen in corrupt, 
developing countries (ibid: 10). 
6.2 Chinese aid 
Lately, China has emerged as a top donor to Cambodia, in certain years claiming 
the spot as the single biggest donor. In 2008 China committed US$257 million to 
Cambodia. The same year, traditional donors such as the EU and Japan donated 
US$214 respectively US$113 (Brinkley: 2011: 349, Ear, 2013: 28). The aid 
relationship between Cambodia and China is a special in the way that it benefits 
both nations. Cambodia gets unconditional economic growth, developed 
infrastructure and a strong ally, whilst China gets access to Cambodian land and 
resources (Hughes, 2009: 162, Ear, 2013: 28). The aid from China is in general 
only tied to conditions that are beneficial to China. The conditions are e.g. that 
Cambodia supports and propels China’s political interests, import products from 
China or allow them to use resources within Cambodia (Pheakdey, 2013, Ear, 
2013: 86). Whenever Cambodia is criticised and put under pressure form NGOs 
or the other states to stop human rights abuses and oppression, the government 
turns to China for financial aid or other types of support (Ear, 2013:28, 30). In 
2011, Hun Sen expressed that he viewed China as a very close friend whom 
responded to Cambodia’s need without any complicated conditions attached to the 
aid (ibid: 28). On a different occasion he remarked that the aid from China 
released Cambodia from the pressure and conditions set by international 
community (Brinkley: 2011: 349). The Chinese aid allows the Cambodian 
government to reconsidered their need of traditional aid with its conditions of 
development strategies, transparency and political reforms (Hughes – Un, 2011: 3, 
Sullivan, 2011: 56). Sullivan (2011: 67) argues that as long as Chinese aid and 
investment remains as a possible alternative, the conditional aid from traditional 
donors might become more unappealing to Cambodia. This has also been a 
concern of human rights activists in Cambodia who have argued that traditional 
donors are loosing influence and therefore the power to make demands of 
improved human rights conditions in Cambodia (Ear, 2013: 123-24). 
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The involvement of China as a donor may harm the Cambodian industrial 
development. The Chinese companies are exploiting natural resources and land in 
Cambodia and exporting goods from Cambodia to China. This can make 
Cambodia dependent on the Chinese economic activity taking place within 
Cambodia (Sullivan, 2011: 64). The Chinese foreign aid policy in Cambodia has 
been referred to as the Chinese use of soft power. Soft power is the use of non-
violent methods such as diplomacy, aid, investments etc. in order to influence the 
actions of another state to your own liking (ibid: 54-55). The Chinese 
unconditional aid has mainly been used to improve infrastructure in Cambodia 
(Cock, 2011: 41, Pheakdey 2013). These investments in infrastructures, such as 
roads and electricity, is suspected to primarily benefit China, allowing them 
access to Cambodian land and resources, such as oil and gas, to exploit (Sullivan, 
2011: 64). Therefore, the Chinese aid mainly concerns what China can get from 
Cambodia, rather than vice versa. 
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7 The impact of aid on Cambodia’s 
development  
The involvement of foreign actor may have prevented Cambodia from falling 
back into old patterns of civil war and genocide, however it has not managed to 
establish a positive and stable peace in the country. Instead, something Ear 
(2013:110) refers to as a hollow democracy has evolved, wherein democratic 
processes exists, such as elections, but without ever progressing into effective 
democratic institutions. As a post-conflict country corruption is part of 
Cambodia’s past. It started to become a major issue already in the 1960s and 
1970s. Today, the aid dependence that has assumed the country has nearly 
worsened the corruption problem (Hughes, 2009: 157). In todays Cambodia the 
political will and incitement for changing, or rather extinguish, the culture of 
corruption is lacking (Ear, 2013: 11, 85).  
 
From 1999 through to 2010, Cambodia experienced a rapid growth of almost 10 
percent per year (Naron, 2012: 248). An explanation for this is that the business 
environment for the private sector in Cambodia is one of the friendliest in the 
region, providing tax holiday and a fairly open market environment. A tax holiday 
is usually used by governments to increase investments by creating a temporary 
reduction of tax. In Cambodia the tax holiday can start from the first year the 
business makes profit and last up to nine years, with the possibility of extension. 
This allows business to avoid the 20 percent corporate tax on profit (Ear, 2013: 
55). What is problematic with this is that the growth and development that is 
occurring in the country, is not contributing to the welfare and therefore not 
developing the basic services. By not paying corporate taxes, the growth that is 
happening in the private sector will mainly benefit the people within that sector, 
not the people who need it the most. This is possible because the government 
doesn’t priorities the basic services, partly because it doesn’t have to since the aid 
agencies and NGOs are prioritising it (ibid: 17). Aid allows Cambodia to not 
prioritise basic services such as health care, education and social welfare, this is 
also described as aid fungibility. Aid fungibility is “the possibility for aid 
recipient countries to reduce investments of their own resources in the sector that 
receives aid and transfer them to other sectors of the budget” (ibid: 32). This 
entails that these basic services will not be viable without aid since the 
government never has to prioritise it and instead focuses on development e.g. 
security, the military or infrastructure. On numerous occasions the Cambodian 
government has expressed that Cambodia, as a post-conflictual state, should 
  
21 
prioritise social stability and economic growth over individual human rights and 
political liberty (Un, 2006: 238). The reason why the government can prioritise in 
such a manner is because it doesn’t have to rely on taxations (Ear, 2013: 17). 
During the 1990s and the 2000s foreign aid dominated the governmental spending 
in Cambodia and between 2002 and 2010 the net aid received was on average 94.3 
percent of the governments spending (ibid: 8-9). With aid covering a large part of 
the national budget, which otherwise would consist of tax revenues, Cambodia 
has no reason to strive for governance accountability.  
 
In Cambodia, the majority of highly educated people choose to work in donor 
agencies or NGOs which, due to aid, are able to offer higher wages than the public 
sector. This means that Cambodia looses an important part of the countries 
resources, namely human capital, to aid agencies and other foreign actors. The 
salaries of civil servants in Cambodia has increased over the years and, in 2013, 
was estimated to a monthly wage of US$20 to US$40, which is remarkably less 
than the wages in the aid sector (Hughes, 2009: 160, Ear, 2013: 32-33). In 2008 
when a vice president of an Cambodian university was asked if it was likely that 
university graduates took jobs as civil servants this was the given reply: “If you 
look at government salary, unless you plan to be corrupted, you have no future in 
that.” (Ear, 2013: 32). This means that Cambodia looses it’s educated people to 
the aid sector, which otherwise could have, and would have, helped develop the 
country from within, either as entrepreneurs or government workers. Further, in a 
country where its most educated citizens are working for NGOs and aid agencies, 
these people will naturally be dependent on these donor-driven actors, just as any 
working person is dependent on their source of income (ibid: 33). Therefore, even 
if the goal of aid is to help Cambodia develop so the nation can soon stand on its 
own feet, a high proportion of its educated people will have an interest in 
Cambodia staying aid dependent.  
7.1 The impact of aid on grass-root level livelihood 
Nearly 80 percent of the Cambodian population, and 90 percent of the poor, live 
in rural areas and 55 percent of the population has agriculture as their occupation 
(Brinkley, 2011: 6, Hughes – Un, 2011: 11, Sothirak, 2012: 338). More than 
three-quarters of these rural households grow rice, which accounts for almost 25 
percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in agriculture. Growing rice is what 
most poor people in Cambodia live on and there is a common understanding that 
the agricultural sector, in particularly rice production, is of great importance for 
the development and future survival of Cambodia (Sjöberg - Sjöholm, 2005: 5, 
Naron, 2012: 268, Ear, 2013: 67) However, very little of aid directed to Cambodia 
goes to the agriculture sector and the investment in the sector is very low. Instead 
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of developing the sector wherein most of the population is, the aid goes to 
developing technical assistance, not actually benefiting the poor (Brinkley: 2011: 
198, Ear, 2013: 68, 77). This becomes apparent when looking at the agricultural 
sectors share in annual GDP. However good economic growth Cambodia has 
experienced during the post-conflictual era, this doesn’t seem to have rubbed of 
on the agricultural sector. In 1989 the sectors share in annual GDP was 45.8 
percent. In 2007 this figure had dropped to 29.7 percent, which is a remarkable 
decline (Naron, 2012: 268). Even the high development of infrastructure in 
Cambodia has been kept from the rural area and instead mainly directed to urban 
areas of the country. The lacking investment in infrastructure in rural areas is 
hampering the development of these areas. This also affects the provision of 
healthcare since the lack of roads makes it difficult to access the hospitals or for 
ambulances to reach the rural villages and households (Naron, 2012: 270). 
 
The EU sponsored initiative Everything But Arms (EBA) was set up to boost 
least-developed countries’ economies by eliminating duties on e.g. rice exports to 
Europe. The EBA is a form of aid that eliminates expenses, instead of donating 
money to pay for them. The purpose of the EBA was to benefit the poor by 
creating job opportunities (Equitable Cambodia – IDI, 2013: 1). However, many 
international actors jumped on this opportunity and began buying up land in 
Cambodia to produce and export rice at low cost (Ear, 2013: 69-70). Therefore, 
the EU initiative didn’t have as good of an impact for the Cambodian people as 
one would have hoped.  
7.2 The impact of aid on human rights – Land 
grabbing 
Land grabbing and forced evection are serious violation of human rights and 
major issues in the rural areas of Cambodia where thousands of people have been 
made homeless (Ear, 2013: 8, Equitable Cambodia - IDI, 2013: 41). A big 
proportion of the poor in Cambodia make their living on farming. Therefore the 
increasing landlessness among the poor due to land grabbing is an acute problem. 
In 1997 13 percent of the rural population where landless, in 1999 this number 
increased to 16 percent and in 2007 it reached 20 percent. This increase in 
landless people has been argued to be result of the corruption and bad governance 
in the country (Hughes – Un, 2011: 10, Sothirak, 2012: 353). The Cambodian 
government is allowing private investors to access large quantities of land for 
large-scale plantations. This land is often already inhabited or used by local 
communities (Equitable Cambodia - IDI, 2013: 1). Hughes and Un (2011: 9) 
argue that the widespread issue of land grabbing and forced evections is partly 
because of collaborations between Chinese investors and the Cambodian 
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government. Since 1994, almost 50 percent of land concessions, more than four 
million hectares, that has been granted to foreign actors by the Cambodian 
government has goes to Chinese investors (Pheakdey, 2013). However, it is 
common that people are forcefully evicted due to development of infrastructure, 
such as roads (We Will Not Be Moved, 2013). As noted earlier, infrastructure is 
something both non-traditional and traditional donors heavily focus on developing 
(Cock, 2011: 40-41). Therefore, it is highly likely that foreign donors hold some 
responsibility for the people being forcefully evicted due to infrastructural 
development. What makes this even more possible is the considerable lack of 
transparency in the governmental awarding of land to foreign companies 
(Sullivan, 2011: 61). 
 
When the Cambodian government past a new land law in 2001, it changed the 
economic interest and activity within the country. The interest in land among 
Cambodian and foreign investors increased drastically. This has resulted in a 
massive, and often violent, expropriation of poor people and farmers inhabiting 
the areas (Hughes – Un, 2011: 9). The land law says that people that have proof 
that they have occupied land for at least five years before the law was past have 
ownership rights to that land. However, proving this is very difficult for many 
poor people in the rural areas. Without any documents, these people are powerless 
against the big companies and investors. If an investor is interested in a plot of 
land they will use the fact that the people living there don’t have any proof of their 
ownership (We Will Not Be Moved, 2013). In conflict over land ownership the 
court usually responds to bribes. The people inhabiting the land generally can’t 
bribe the judges as well as the foreign companies and investors can (ibid).  
 
More than 500,000 people have been evicted from their homes due to land 
grabbing and thousands of communities have been destroyed (We Will Not Be 
Moved, 2013). The people living in these rural areas may have been poor, but they 
had safety and a roof over their heads (ibid). When they have been forced away, 
they have often just pulled themselves out of poverty only to be thrown back into 
it (Equitable Cambodia - IDI, 2013: 1). At times, the evicted people have been 
sent to live in fields, far away from hospitals, schools and work opportunities (We 
Will Not Be Moved, 2013). When the people from rural areas have tried to protest 
against the land grabbing, they have on numerous occasions been ignored or meet 
with violence and at various times been arrested and imprisoned (Hughes, 2009: 
164, Sullivan, 2011: 63, We Will Not Be Moved, 2013).  
 
The EBA has been argued to be a driving force for increased land grabbing and 
forced evictions. The ability to export goods to the EU at a lower price has made 
foreign companies more interested in exploiting land in under developed countries 
such as Cambodia (Equitable Cambodia - IDI, 2013: 19, 33-35). However, 
according to local NGOs the increased interest in land by foreign actors due to the 
EBA has increased, rather than decreased poverty in the area and others have 
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reported that foreign companies that bought up land due to the EBA initiative 
used child labour on their plantations (Cock, 2011: 42-44, Equitable Cambodia - 
IDI, 2013: 3). 
 
The EU is bound by EU law to respect human rights in all its trade relations 
(Equitable Cambodia - IDI, 2013: 44), However the two NGOs Equitable 
Cambodia and Inclusive Development International (IDI) (2013: 3, 19) argues that 
the EU with its EBA initiative is violating international human rights as long as it 
doesn’t include safeguards for human rights within the trade initiative. Currently, 
the EBA does not include any types of safeguards to protect the poor within 
developing countries. Furthermore, within the EU there is no mechanism for 
compensating people who have been affected by EU policies or actions of 
European actors and companies outside the EU borders (ibid: 3). 
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8 Results & discussion 
In this section I will discuss exactly what it is that makes aid a trap. The empirical 
data will be compared to Colliers traps that where presented in the Traps section.   
When comparing the natural resource trap with the impact of aid in Cambodia, 
certain similarities become very apparent. Collier (2007: 44-46) argues that 
natural resource richness in bottom billion countries can harm governance 
capacity by providing the government with a large budget, reducing the need to 
tax and thereby reducing the need for accountability. This precise thing can be 
seen in Cambodia, but where foreign aid plays the role of the natural resource. 
However, a significant difference is that when it comes to aid, it doesn’t only 
reduce the need for the governance accountability, it also makes it aid dependent, 
having to rely on foreign actors. Collier (2007: 51) argues that when a resource 
rich bottom billion country is on the verge of transitioning to democracy from 
autocracy, the sort of democracy this country is likely to get is not more than a 
political charade. This was also detected in Cambodia where the elections became 
a tool to please the observing world, rather then a tool of democracy. Since the 
UN monitored election in 1993, Hun Sen has used the election to legitimise his 
role as a leader, making Cambodia into a one party state (McCargo , 2005: 99-
100, 107, Cock, 2011: 28). 
 
Furthermore, Collier (2007: 51) argues that natural resource richness isn’t bad per 
say. However, in a bottom billion country that is developing, the necessary 
political restrain and good governance isn’t well enough established. The same 
can be argued for aid. Due to the nature of a post-conflictual country, like 
Cambodia, the political restraint on the government will not be sufficiently 
established to make good use of the aid to the extent that it benefits the entire 
nation. To measure political restrain Collier uses a system of counting checks-
and-balances. This is something I have not come across during my research on aid 
dependence in Cambodia. However, when reading about its possible effects for 
the natural resource trap, it becomes apparent that it could have a similarly 
positive effect on aid dependence. A problem in Cambodia is the lost need for 
accountability and tax revenues, partly due to corruption and unofficial taxes, 
which have been facilitated by the reliance on aid. If Cambodia had to focus on 
developing more checks-and-balances, the domestic, rather than international, 
pressure to deliver and perform well might make accountability a more valuable 
quality to obtain for political parties.  
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In Collier’s (2007: 66) bad governance trap he argues for two main reasons for 
bad governance in bottom billion countries, which makes it a trap. The fact that 
the political leaders in bottom billion countries often lack motivation to reform 
and, secondly, the lack of educated people to conduct the political reform. He 
further argues that the few who obtain the necessary education in these countries 
often seek better jobs abroad (Collier, 2007: 67). Both these issues can be found in 
the case of Cambodia, however not solely due to bad governance, but due to 
foreign aid. Firstly, political leaders in Cambodia surely lack motivation to 
reform. Due to the flow of aid from non-traditional donors such as China, the 
government can more or less ignore outside pressure to reform. Additionally, due 
to aid the government’s need for taxation decreases which furthers increases its 
ability to ignore pressure and demands from within the society. Secondly, 
Cambodia looses much of its educated people to the aid sector, which both keeps 
the country aid dependent and hampers the development of the country “from 
within” the country.  
 
In this thesis I chose to put emphasises on the impact of aid on both grass-root 
level livelihood and on human rights. There are many human rights violations 
taking place in Cambodia and reviewing all would exceed the scope of this thesis. 
Therefore, I focused on primarily one human right violation, land grabbing with 
consequences of forced eviction. Focusing on the part of the data that supports the 
generation of theory will make sure the data stays relevant to the development of 
theory (Hartman, 2001: 97-98) and therefore to the methodology of the thesis. 
This is why this human right violation was singled out, thus it gives support to the 
development of the aid trap and is therefore most relevant to the study. 
Furthermore, by focusing on grass-root level livelihood the impact that aid can 
have on the poor within a bottom billion country becomes very apparent. It is not 
only the development that is harmed by the aid, the poorest pays a very high price 
for it as well.  
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9 Conclusion  
To conclude this thesis I will return to the questions which this study initially 
aimed to answer: “In what way can foreign aid be considered to harm the post-
conflictual development of Cambodia with a focus on grass-root level and human 
rights?” and “To what extent is foreign aid to be considered as a threat to post-
conflictual development and therefore to be considered as a trap for 
development?”. After analysing the impact aid has on the development of 
Cambodia and what consequences it brings to the population on a grass-root level 
and on human rights, I conclude that aid, whether from traditional or non-
traditional donors, can hamper the development and bring devastating 
consequences for the grass-root population in a country like Cambodia. This is 
because even if the outlines of Chinese and traditional aid is very different in 
concern of conditions on reforms etc., (Sullivan, 2011: 58-59) the way Cambodia 
deals with the aid is actually very similar. 
 
I found in this study that it is not the aid itself that is problematic, but when 
directed at a developing state with serious problems of governance and limited 
political restraint, it can become a trap that keeps these states from developing. 
Through the analysis conducted in this study on the affect aid brings to not only 
state-level development but, more importantly, to human rights and grass-root 
level development, it becomes apparent that the aid trap is a very real danger to 
developing states. Considering aid as trap is of great importance in order for the 
international community to recognise it as a danger to, not only development, but 
also human rights and security.  
  
Collier (2007: 12) argues that growth has to begin from within the bottom billion 
societies. This is a very accurate argument when it comes to escaping the aid trap. 
The international community has to focus on building the nation from within, 
supporting local initiatives, minimise corruption and improve basic civil services 
such as education and health care. 
9.1 Further research  
Further research on aid dependency and the aid trap is needed witch is also 
pointed out by Ear (2013:142) who argues that more case studies is needed to 
shed light on the dangers of aid dependency. I believe that future research within 
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this area has to focus more on the implications aid has on human rights and 
poverty, and not solely on its effects on economic growth and development.   
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